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Creativity is a complex construct that would benefit from a more comprehensive mechanistic approach. Two processes have been defined to be central to creative
cognition: divergent and convergent thinking. These two processes are most often studied using the Alternate Uses Test (heavily relying on divergent thinking), and
the Remote Associates Test (heavily relying on convergent thinking, at least with analytical solutions). Although creative acts should be regarded compound processes,
most behavioral and neuroimaging studies ignore the composition of basic operations relevant for the task they investigate. In order to provide leverage for a more
mechanistic, and eventually even comprehensive computational, approach to creative cognition, we compare findings from divergent and convergent thinking studies
and review the similarities and differences between the two underlying types of processes, from a neurocognitive perspective with a strong focus on cortical structures.
In this narrative review, we discuss a broad scope of neural correlates of divergent and convergent thinking. We provide a first step towards theoretical integration, by
suggesting that creative cognition in divergent- and convergent-thinking heavy tasks is modulated by metacontrol states, where divergent thinking and insight so-
lutions in convergent-thinking tasks seem to benefit from metacontrol biases towards flexibility, whereas convergent, analytical thinking seems to benefit from
metacontrol biases towards persistence. These particular biases seem to be reflected by specific cortical brain-activation patterns, involving left frontal and right
temporal/parietal networks. Our tentative framework could serve as a first proxy to guide neuroscientific creativity research into assessing more mechanistic details of
human creative cognition.1. Introduction
Creativity is a mysterious and complex phenomenon thought to be
capital of the human mind. It has shown to be hard to objectify and
quantify, which has hampered mechanistic approaches of creativity. Yet,
despite its complexity, it can be seen as an ability requiring both origi-
nality and effectiveness (Runco and Jaeger, 2012). The construct of
creativity is thought to comprise two measurable cognitive ingredients
that are crucial to the creative processes everyone experiences on a daily
basis: divergent and convergent thinking (Guilford, 1967). Divergent
thinking represents a style of thinking that allows idea generation, in a
context where the selection criteria are relatively vague and more than
one solution is correct. Divergent thinking, therefore, involves flexibility
of the mind. In contrast, convergent thinking represents a style of
thinking that allows finding single solutions to a well-defined problem,
which requires more persistence and focus (Guilford, 1950; Runco,
2010). Interestingly, one could potentially distinguish the two processes
in earlier models on stages of creative processes. For example, almost a
century ago, Wallas (1926) suggested that creative acts run through four
stages including (1) preparation: the problem is investigated; (2) incu-
bation: the problem is thought about unconsciously; (3) illumination:* Corresponding author.
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nc-nd/4.0/).ideas come together to form a possible solution; and (4) verification: the
chosen option is evaluated. It makes sense to characterize the first two
stages as relying more on divergent thinking and the last two stages as
relying more on convergent thinking.
Considering the different characteristics of divergent and convergent
thinking and the different roles they play at the stages of creative pro-
duction, it makes sense to assume that the two thinking styles rely on
different functional and neural mechanisms (Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel, 2010; Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004). Unfortunately, however,
research on creativity has often considered creativity as one coherent
concept that relies on one coherent ability that can be assessed by means
of comprehensive, unitary questionnaires or tasks that lump together
separable, presumably rather different components—which does not
seem to do sufficient justice to the underlying mechanics. Even studies
that did not equate the two thinking styles have focused exclusively on
either divergent tasks (for overviews and discussion, see Baas et al., 2008;
Davis, 2009) or convergent tasks (e.g., Isen et al., 1987), providing a
rather fragmented, non-comprehensive view on creativity mechanisms.
And yet, multiple findings support the assumption of critical differences
between divergent and convergent thinking. In particular, divergent and
convergent thinking could be demonstrated to be (1) inducing different,January 2020
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Fig. 1. The dual pathway to creativity model according to Nijstad et al.
(2010). There are two pathways to achieve creativity: a flexibility and a
persistence pathway, and both pathways are influenced by situational (denoted
with Xi) and dispositional (denoted with Pi) factors. However, some situational
and dispositional variables affect the flexibility pathway more strongly than the
persistence pathway, and vice versa, which is indicated by solid (stronger
relation) and dotted (weaker or negative relation) lines, respectively. Reprinted
without changes, with permission from Taylor and Francis (www.tandfonline.co
m), based on Fig. 1 from Nijstad et al. (2010) The dual pathway to creativity
model: Creative ideation as a function of flexibility and persistence, European
Review of Social Psychology, 21:1, 34–77.
W. Zhang et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116572or even opposite, mood states (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2012a);
(2) associated with different metacontrol states (Hommel, 2015); (3)
differently related to the neuromodulatory dopamine system in the brain
(Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010); and (4) differently influenced
by behavioral interventions such as meditation (Colzato et al., 2012;
Colzato et al., 2014).
Even though these and other observations point to important differ-
ences between divergent and convergent thinking, there are also some
indications of similarities. For instance, whereas individual measures of
performance in divergent and convergent thinking tasks have been re-
ported to be uncorrelated in a study of European participants (Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2010), significant positive correlations be-
tween the two measurements were found in Chinese participants (Shen
et al., 2018a,b). Moreover, a recent explorative open-label study on
microdosing psilocybin, known to influence serotonin receptors in the
brain, indicated that both divergent and convergent thinking processes
improve after taking microdoses of psilocybin (Prochazkova et al., 2018).
Similarly, it was found that convergent and divergent thinking do share
similarities in neural patterns, especially in increased alpha band activity
as measured with electroencephalography (EEG) (Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004; Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b).
To summarize, divergent and convergent thinking are sub-
components of creativity that show both similarities and differences that
are far from being understood (Mekern et al., 2019a; Sternberg et al.,
2013). The current, subcomponent-indifferent approach, and the lack of
understanding on differences and similarities between the two, severely
limits our opportunities to systematically study and effectively enhance
human creativity. The purpose of the present narrative review is to
provide an overview and a theoretical integration of what is known in the
literature about similarities and differences between convergent and
divergent thinking. We see this as an important first step, before looking
further into more detailed computational processes that could more
readily be connected to neural correlates, and further improve our
knowledge on creative mechanisms. We will discuss the similarities and
differences between divergent and convergent thinking in the context of
both behavioral and neuroimaging findings, to give further leverage to
studying and understanding more detailed underlying neurocognitive
mechanisms of the complex construct of creativity. The theoretical
integration that we suggest is based on the assumption that divergent and
convergent thinking rely on systematic differences in the underlying
metacontrol state (Hommel, 2015), that is, on the general
information-processing mode that the thinking individual establishes in
order to carry out divergent- or convergent-thinking tasks. In the
following, we will first explain what a metacontrol state is and how it
may relate to divergent and convergent thinking in terms of functional
characteristics, neuromodulation, and brain areas involved. Then we will
briefly discuss how divergent and convergent thinking can be measured,
and on which particular tasks our review will focus, before we review the
behavioral and cortical neuronal key findings related to divergent and
convergent thinking.
1.1. Metacontrol of divergent and convergent thinking
Given that divergent and convergent thinking are likely to serve
different purposes and to satisfy different task demands, it is important to
characterize these two thinking styles in more detail. To account for these
differences, the Dual Pathway to Creativity (DPC) Model (Nijstad et al.,
2010) has been proposed. The model distinguishes between a flexibility
route and a persistence route to creative performance, and it assumes that
creative products and even different measures in the same creativity task
may rely on these two routes to different degrees. To create a highly
original idea or product, flexibility is needed to switch between different
and remote associations to find a better idea or solution (Vartanian,
2009), but persistence is also required to focus on the task at hand and to
find the final solution (De Dreu et al., 2012). The two routes can thus be
assumed to collaborate differently in divergent and convergent thinking:2the flexibility route may dominate in divergent thinking, and in partic-
ular when switching between different categories, whereas the persis-
tence route may dominate in convergent thinking or in producing
different items of the same category in divergent thinking (Fig. 1).
The idea that behavior emerges from a balance between persistence
and flexibility is also key in the Metacontrol State Model (MSM; Hommel,
2015), a model that was conceived to account for cognitive control in
general, but that can be easily applied to creativity and convergent and
divergent thinking as well. The MSM is used to describe the balance
between persistence and flexibility in any kind of decision-making,
which the model assumes (following Bogacz, 2007) to be competitive
(winner-takes-all) and biased according to currently active goals (see
competition and top-down bias in Fig. 2, respectively). If, thus, two or
more goal-related representations compete for selection (indicated by
mutual inhibition), increases in activation of a better alternative reduces
the activation of the other. The degree to which alternatives compete and
to which they are biased by current goals is determined by the present
metacontrol state, which varies between persistence and flexibility.
Extreme persistence would consist in strong mutual competition as well
as top-down bias, whereas extreme flexibility would consist in weak
competition and weak top-down bias. Accordingly, convergent thinking
would be expected to rely on, or at least benefit from, a bias towards
persistence, whereas divergent thinking should rely on, or benefit from, a
bias towards flexibility (Hommel, 2015; Hommel and Colzato, 2017b;
Mekern et al., 2019b).
The DPC and the MSM models differ in focus and emphasis, but they
are highly consistent for the most part and both relate to dopaminergic
activity. In particular, striatal dopamine and the integrity of the nigros-
triatal dopamine pathway have been assumed to be associated with
flexible processing, and prefrontal dopamine and the integrity of the
mesocortical dopaminergic pathway with persistent processing (Boot
et al., 2017a,b; Hommel and Colzato, 2017b).
Empirical findings support the idea that divergent and convergent
thinking are related to flexibility and persistence, respectively. The link
between divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility receives support
from the observation that positive mood, which is assumed to support
flexibility (Baas et al., 2008; Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2012a;
Ritter and Ferguson, 2017), was shown to promote “loose thinking” and
creative thought (Ashby and Isen, 1999; Baas et al., 2008), and engaging
in divergent thinking introduces more positive mood states (Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2012a). Along the same lines, spontaneous
eyeblink rates, which are assumed to be a marker of the striatal dopamine
level (Jongkees and Colzato, 2016)—the dopaminergic pathway that
cognitive flexibility is assumed to rely on (Klanker et al., 2013)—predict
Fig. 2. Key assumptions of the Metacontrol State Model according to
Hommel (2015). Metacontrol flexibility states are characterized by the strength
of top-down guidance from goal representations for goal-consistent selection
candidates and the strength of mutual competition for alternative selection
candidates. Flexibility is implemented through weak top-down guidance and
mutual competition, whereas persistence is characterized by strong top-down
guidance and mutual competition. Reprinted without changes, with permis-
sion from Elsevier based on Fig. 1a from Hommel (2015) Between persistence
and flexibility: The Yin and Yang of action control. In: A.J. Elliot (ed.), Advances
in motivation science, Vol. 2 (pp. 33–67). New York: Elsevier.
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Hommel, 2010). This in turn fits with the observation that inducing
positive mood increases both spontaneous eyeblink rates and
divergent-thinking performance (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel,
2012b). Analogously, divergent thinking benefits from engaging in
open-monitoring meditation, which has been assumed to induce more
flexible metacontrol states (Hommel and Colzato, 2017a). Conversely,
engaging in divergent thinking was shown to affect performance in ways
that have been assumed to reflect a metacontrol bias towards flexibility
(Hommel and Colzato, 2017a), such as more integrating bystanders into
one’s self-representation (Colzato et al., 2013) or increasing interper-
sonal trust (Sellaro et al., 2014).
In addition, spontaneous mind wandering (Baird et al., 2012) and
decreased latent inhibition (Carson et al., 2003) have been related to
flexible cognition (Mason et al., 2007; Nonkes et al., 2012; Ottaviani
et al., 2013) and seem to facilitate divergent thinking. Subclinical
symptoms of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), a disorder
associated with high impulsivity and flexibility (Colomer et al., 2017;
Sinzig et al., 2008), were also found to be associated with enhanced
divergent thinking (Boot et al., 2017a,b). Moreover, the personality traits
openness and extraversion are selectively correlated with divergent
thinking, but not convergent thinking (Chamorro-Premuzic and Reich-
enbacher, 2008)—thus also suggesting a dissociation.
Other findings provide support for a link between convergent
thinking and cognitive persistence. For instance, working memory per-
formance, which is related to executive function and involvement of the
prefrontal cortex, could predict convergent thinking but not divergent
thinking (Lee and Therriault, 2013). Moreover, engaging in convergent
thinking was found to induce negative mood (Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel, 2012a), which in turn is suspected to narrowing the focus of
attention (Rowe et al., 2007); but see Bruyneel et al., 2013). Along
similar lines, convergent thinking benefits from focused-attention
meditation, which is assumed to induce a metacontrol bias towards
persistence (Colzato et al., 2012), and from bilingualism, which is ex-
pected to do the same (Hommel et al., 2011). In addition, engaging in
convergent thinking task was found to increase top-down control and
reduce cross-talk in dual-task performance (Fischer and Hommel, 2012).32. Neuromodulation of metacontrol
The emphasis of both the DPC model and the MSM on dopamine was
fueled by, and received support from numerous findings from research on
the impact of neurotransmitters on cognitive control (see the recent re-
views by Boot et al., 2017a,b, and Hommel and Colzato, 2017b, which we
briefly summarize here). In a nutshell, there is increasing evidence from
neuroscientific analyses and behavioral genetics that creative cognition
is a function of dopaminergic modulation in fronto-striatal brain cir-
cuitries, and that persistence as well as flexibility in creative cognition
are modulated by prefrontal dopamine and striatal dopamine, respec-
tively. More specifically, findings suggest that the mesocortical dopa-
minergic pathway that originates in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and
innervates the prefrontal cortex (Goldman-Rakic, 1992), is fueling
cognitive persistence. It is less clear whether this is because the meso-
cortical dopaminergic pathway is driving prefrontal cortex as a whole
(e.g. Cools, 2008) or whether it mainly drives dopaminergic D1 family
receptors that dominate, but are not restricted to prefrontal cortex
(Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008). The same logic applies to the striatal
dopaminergic pathway that originates in the Substantia Nigra and was
found to promote cognitive flexibility: this may be because the pathway
drive striatal processing as a whole or because it drives dopaminergic D2
family receptors that dominate, but are not restricted to the striatum
This share of labor is consistent with findings from behavioral ge-
netics, which show that individuals with a genetic predisposition for
particularly efficient dopaminergic processing in prefrontal areas excel in
persistence-heavy tasks whereas individuals with a genetic predisposi-
tion for efficient dopaminergic processing in the striatum excel in
flexibility-heavy tasks (Hommel and Colzato, 2017b). Interestingly, the
efficiency of dopaminergic processing in prefrontal and striatal areas do
not seem to follow a linear function (for a review, see Goldman-Rakic
et al., 2000). For instance, Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010)
observed that the best performance in divergent thinking was associated
with medium spontaneous blinking rates—a clinical marker of striatal
dopamine (Karson et al., 1983; Taylor et al., 1999). These and other
findings suggest that moderate levels of prefrontal and striatal dopamine
could facilitate cognitive persistence and flexibility, respective-
ly—suggesting an inverted U-shape function linking dopamine levels to
performance (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010, 2012b; Boot et al.,
2017a,b).
In addition to dopamine, one may speculate that norepinephrine
might also play a role in regulating human creativity. More specifically,
the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) neuromodulatory system
has been proposed to regulate the balance between exploitation and
exploration (Beversdorf, 2019; Lin and Vartanian, 2018), a trade-off
which shares many characteristics with the opposition between persis-
tence and flexibility. However, at this point the role of norepinephrine is
much less clear than that of dopamine.
Taken altogether, the available evidence strongly suggests that frontal
and striatal dopaminergic pathways play an important role in human
creativity by regulating cognitive persistence and flexibility. However,
we currently know much more about the neurotransmitters that are
driving creative processes through metacontrol than about the cortical
structures that are being driven by them. To improve this situation, we
asked, in the case of dopamine, and perhaps noradrenaline, are the fuel of
regulating creativity, which areas are fueled by them? After a brief dis-
cussion of the conceptual distinction between convergent and divergent
thinking, and their possible relationship to metacontrol, we will thus
consider which cortical structures might be involved in regulating human
creativity, possibly through metacontrol states, and how they might
interact in order to achieve that. We will put our focus on cortical cor-
relates, and not subcortical areas, as most of our claims are supported by
(surface-based) EEG studies.
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Divergent thinking represents a type of thinking that allows many new
ideas being generated, in a context where more than one solution is
correct. Guilford’s (1967) Alternative Uses Task (AUT) is currently most
used to measure people’s divergent thinking ability: participants are
presented with a particular object, such as a brick, and they are to
generate as many different uses of this object as possible. Classically, four
indicators are used to evaluate AUT performance: fluency (the total
number of ideas generated); flexibility (the number of categories or
themes used by the participants); elaboration (the amount of detail
provided); and originality (the extent to which responses are unique
compared to the rest of the sample, or population). Note that these four
measures assess different aspects of the performance and they differ in
theoretical transparency. Fluency and elaboration are not particularly
specific to creativity (e.g., fluency will be high for participants who
repeat similar versions of the same concept over and over again), and
likely to be particularly sensitive to the participant’s general vocabulary
and motivation. Originality, in contrast, is essential for creativity (Runco
and Jaeger, 2012), but this measure has the disadvantage of being
dependent on the particular sample: uniqueness is commonly assessed
with respect to the current sample under analysis, so that the same per-
formance of a given individual would count less if he or she would
happen to have particularly original fellow participants, an issue that
classically arises when studying ‘creative’ populations such as artists.
This leaves flexibility as the theoretically most transparent measure, as it
qualifies sheer production, by dividing the amount of generated ideas
through the number of different categories being used.
A task such as the AUT would be expected to require rather weak top-
down support, as the search criterion is rather vague, and given that
many answers are possible and correct, the competition between alter-
natives should also be weak. This means that performance in this task
would strongly benefit from a control mode that is biased towards flex-
ibility (Hommel, 2015). This also holds for other tasks that have been
employed to assess divergent thinking, such as creative story writing
(Martindale and Hasenfus, 1978), thinking of unique consequences of a
hypothetical situation (M€olle et al., 1999), a question about how to
measure the length of poisonous snakes (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b), and
unusual problems requiring creative solutions (Fink et al., 2006). How-
ever, in this review, we mainly focus on the AUT as a central measure of
divergent thinking.
Convergent thinking is considered a process of generating one possible
solution to a particular, well-defined problem. Mednick’s (1967) Remote
Associates Test (RAT) fits this profile, and is therefore most commonly
used in the convergent thinking literature: participants are presented
with three unrelated words, such as “cocktail,” “dress,” and “birthday,”
and are to identify the common associate (“party”). The total number of
correct answers is used to evaluate one’s convergent thinking level. This
task provides more and rather tight top-down constraints, and there is
only one possible answer per item, suggesting that the task calls for a
control state with a strong impact of the goal—a bias toward persistence
(Hommel, 2015). Compared with other convergent tasks like color
categorization (Gibson et al., 2009), color matching task (Folley and
Park, 2005), word ends task (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b), and mental
arithmetic (Razoumnikova, 2000), RAT is thought to involve more
creativity-specific processes (Gabora, 2018). The RAT requires partici-
pants to hold one target word as a primary cue and to subsequently think
of other related associations. Therefore, it is likely that, in contrast to
what is commonly assumed, the RAT might also involve aspects of
divergent thinking and, thus, benefit from some degree of flexibility
(Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2015). In this review, we mainly focus on the
RAT as the measurement used for convergent thinking.
A recent methodological innovation concerning the RAT has been
introduced by Kounios and Beeman (2014), who distinguish between
solutions that are (according to self-report) found through analytical
search and solutions found through spontaneous insight. In contrast to4the often step-wise analytical search (also called ‘non-insight’), that can
be compared to hypothesis testing, insight solutions are experienced as
sudden changes in the knowledge representation, leading to a more
‘spontaneous’ solution of a problem accompanied by a burst of emotion
including highly positive surprise (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios
and Beeman, 2014). Given that finding solutions through insight is often
accompanied by a certain lack of focus, it stands to reason that the pro-
cess underlying insight is more similar to divergent thinking than
analytical search would be. Indeed, neural evidence showed that insight
solutions do share similarities with the divergent thinking process. For
example, in the RAT, during the preparation periods followed by insight
solutions, alpha synchronization is seen in the right hemisphere, which is
similar to neural patterns seen in divergent thinking, whereas analytical
solutions during the RAT were associated with alpha desynchronization
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Runco and Yoruk, 2014). However, this
regards the preparation period, and it is so far not yet fully understood
how the actual finding of insight solution relates to divergent thinking as
assessed by the AUT, and thus more empirical evidence is needed.
In any case, these characterizations of divergent and convergent
thinking, and the measures used to assess them, reveal that neither AUT
nor RAT can be assumed to represent process-pure measures of divergent
and convergent thinking or the underlying processes (cf., Nijstad et al.,
2010). While it is certainly true that the AUT requires more divergent
thinking than the RAT, which in turn requires more convergent thinking
than the AUT, we need to keep in mind that in both tasks participants are
required to hold one goal-related concept while switching between other
possible or actual alternatives (Mekern et al., 2019a). Therefore, the two
tasks, as well as the alternatives that have been used, are likely to overlap
to a substantial degree and need both divergent and convergent thinking
and, thus, both flexibility and persistence (Nijstad et al., 2010). One way
to better disentangle divergent and convergent thinking is to better
characterize and identify the functional and neural mechanisms under-
lying these processes, to which we will now turn.
2.2. Neural correlates of divergent and convergent thinking
In recent years, a couple of articles have provided reviews regarding
some neuroscientific aspects of creativity in general or divergent or
convergent thinking in particular, some with an emphasis on the neural
structures being involved (e.g., Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Kounios and
Beeman, 2014; Runco and Yoruk, 2014) and some with an emphasis on
the neurochemical underpinnings (Boot et al., 2017a,b; Hommel and
Colzato, 2017b). Functional patterns, either during rest or task behavior
have provided information on the neurocognitive correlates to creativity,
that might refer back to possible connections with metacontrol of
cognition. For example, creativity benefits from the interaction or
coupling of the executive control network (ECN) and the default network
(DN), which reflects both goal-directed episodic memory retrieval and
prepotent-response inhibition of semantic information (Beaty et al.,
2019), related to persistent cognitive control. The ECN includes lateral
prefrontal and anterior inferior parietal regions and the DN is composed
by a set of midline and posterior inferior parietal regions (Beaty et al.,
2019), thus all areas potentially involved in creativity through their role
in metacontrol cognition.
With respect to the neural aspects that we will focus on in the
following, three cortical areas have repeatedly been indicated in variants
of divergent- and/or convergent-thinking performance: the left inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG), the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and
overall the right hemisphere, with the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and
closely related areas in particular. Highlighting these areas involved in
divergent and convergent thinking implies a discrete localization point-
of-view, attributing compound cognitive constructs such as ‘conver-
gent’ and ‘divergent’ thinking to discrete topographical brain ‘areas’.
Although this point-of-view is outdated, it is still adopted in the bulk of
the neurocognitive literature, including much of the literature we review
here. We will attempt to overcome this, by connecting subprocesses to
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gration of the broader neural circuits that might work together to
generate divergent and convergent behavior. As we will argue in the
following sections, the degree of activation of left IFG and DLPFC, and the
alpha power related to the right PPC and related areas seem to be sys-
tematically related to the different types of creative thinking (divergent
and convergent), suggesting that a broad network with these three areas
as core cortical hubs serves to implement different metacontrol policies.
2.3. Left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC)
The left IFG has been found activated both in the AUT and during
insight trials of the RAT in fMRI studies. Activation of the left IFG was
also found during other divergent thinking tasks, such as generating
words from a single letter (Badzakova-Trajkov et al., 2011), creating a
book cover from description (Ellamil et al., 2012), brainstorming (Shah
et al., 2013), in the Object Characteristics Task, the Name Invention Task
and the Word Ends Task (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b). During the AUT, the
left IFG has been found more active than in control tasks, like an object
location task or an n-back task (Abraham et al., 2012), or during mere
retrieval of original ideas from long-term memory (Benedek et al., 2014)
or mere fixation of a fixation cross (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b). Notably, in
a figural divergent thinking task of the Torrance Test of Creative
Thinking (Huang et al., 2013), comparison with the generation of
non-original ideas showed that the left IFG was also activated (Huang
et al., 2013). In the RAT, the left IFG was also more activated during
insight trials than during non-insight trials (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004).
Interestingly, a meta-analysis on neuroimaging studies of insight (Shen
et al., 2018a) provided evidence of an integrated network of
insight-activated regions, which includes left IFG, right medial frontal
gyrus, the left amygdala, and the right hippocampus. A tDCS study sug-
gests that it may not so much be the degree of activation of left or right
IFG that matters in creativity tasks but rather the balance between these
two areas. Mayseless and Shamay-Tsoory (2015) have used tDCS to
change this balance systematically by comparing a
left-IFG-cathodal/right-IFG-anodal montage with the opposite set-up
(left-IFG-anodal/right-IFG-cathodal). As predicted, cathodal (deactivat-
ing) tDCS over the left, and anodal (activating) tDCS over the right IFG
improved divergent-thinking performance in an AUT, whereas the
opposite montage or separate stimulation of left and right IFG did not
affect performance.
What might be the role of left IFG in creativity tasks? The left IFG is
generally thought to be associated with cognitive control, interference
resolution, and response selection (Abraham et al., 2012; Benedek et al.,
2014; Chrysikou, 2019). More specifically, activation of the left IFG is
related to high flexibility scores of the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking
(Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007), which implies a link to metacontrol flexi-
bility. Patients with selective lesions in the left IFG were found to make
more errors in a task that requires suppressing prepotent manual re-
sponses to letter stimuli in a Go/NoGo task (Swick et al., 2008) and on a
verb generation task for nouns that had many possible responses, such as
‘cat’, but not for nouns that had few possible responses, such as ‘scissors’
(Thompson-Schill et al., 1998). This pattern fits with the suggestion of
Jung-Beeman (2005) that left IFG might be involved in the selection of
semantic representations and in inhibiting concepts competing for action
or for consciousness. Accordingly, left IFG might combine aspects of
persistence—by inhibiting irrelevant thoughts—with aspects of
flexibility—by facilitating the search within the pool of relevant
thoughts. Evidence has shown that this region presumably mediates the
semantic selection in the generation of novel, original ideas, a ubiquitous
process in divergent thinking tasks (Seger et al., 2000), and it seems to be
particularly sensitive to the influence of semantic distance or associative
strength concepts, as weaker associative strength often leads to a stronger
BOLD response in this area (Abraham et al., 2012; Bunge et al., 2004;
Green et al., 2010).5Of particular interest, the activation patterns of left IFG suggests
stronger commonalities between divergent thinking (e.g. as measured
with AUT) and insight solutions in the RAT, which both lead to strong
activation in this structure (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b; Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004), than between insight solutions and analytical solutions in the
RAT, as the former activates the left IFG much more than the latter
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). However, it is important to keep in mind that
all comparisons between divergent and convergent thinking that we
consider were obtained with verbal material. Given that the involvement
of left IFG seems to depend on the verbal nature of the stimulus material
(Boccia et al., 2015), this means that the role we consider for the left IFG
might not generalize to other stimulus domains.
The left DLPFC has been associated with cognitive control including
executive functioning and working memory (Andrews et al., 2011), and
is thought to facilitate creativity by maintaining focused-attention and
goals, manipulating information in working memory, and inhibiting
task-irrelevant information (Beaty and Schacter, 2018), which is more
related to metacontrol persistence. Although the left DLPFCwas shown to
be activated during the AUT task (Beaty et al., 2015), transcranial direct
current stimulation (tDCS) of left DLPFC facilitates convergent thinking
performance somewhat more reliably than divergent thinking (Zmigrod
et al., 2015). This can be connected back to metacontrol, as persistence,
which requires participants to keep on the goal of the task, is related to
working memory and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Curtis
and D’Esposito, 2003). Interestingly, cognitive flexibility, which is
related to the activation of the left IFG (Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007), has
been found to be associated with the deactivation of the DLPFC in pa-
tients with bipolar disorder, who performed a simple motor response
flexibility task (Nelson et al., 2007).
In conclusion, the left IFG and DLPFC are both active in divergent and
convergent thinking, but they seem to have opposite activation dynamics
and facilitate different types of creative thinking. The left IFG, which has
been found mostly activated (or more strongly activated than right IFG:
Mayseless and Shamay-Tsoory, 2015) in divergent-thinking and other
cognitive flexibility task, might implement metacontrol flexibility, while
the activated left DLPFC might implement persistence, which helps in
convergent thinking but hinders in flexibility tasks.
2.4. The right hemisphere
In EEG studies of divergent and convergent thinking, changes in alpha
synchronization (Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999) have often been
observed. While overall increased alpha synchronization was found
during both divergent and convergent thinking tasks (Benedek et al.,
2011), alpha synchronization was found to be particularly strong in the
right hemisphere during divergent thinking tasks (for a review: Runco
and Yoruk, 2014). Specifically, during AUT performance, participants
who scored higher on originality showed higher alpha synchronization in
the right posterior parietal cortex compared to their lower scoring
counterparts (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b). In line with this, compared with
deliberate mind wandering, which requires more cognitive control,
participants with higher rates of spontaneous mind wandering, thought
to reflect a more flexible state, showed cortical thinning in the regions of
the right parietal cortex (Golchert et al., 2017). Taken altogether, this
suggests that structural changes in the right parietal cortex might also be
an indicator of flexibility.
In the RAT, alpha power in this specific region was also increased in
the preparation period of insight trials specifically (Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004; Kounios et al., 2006). As discussed above, insight solutions can be
suspected to rely more on metacontrol flexibility than analytical solu-
tions, suggesting a close association between right hemisphere alpha
synchronization and metacontrol flexibility.
In contrast, tasks with a stronger convergent-thinking component
(e.g., intelligence tests of mental arithmetic or reports of the common
ending of well-known proverbs), show more alpha desynchronization
than divergent-thinking tasks (Krug et al., 2003; M€olle et al., 1999;
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(specifically during the preparation period), stronger alpha desynchro-
nization in the occipital cortex was found compared than in insight trials
(Kounios et al., 2006).
The emerging pattern of stronger alpha synchronization in areas of
the right hemisphere during more flexibility-heavy tasks, like divergent
thinking or insight solutions in convergent tasks, and alpha desynchro-
nization in these structures during persistence-heavy, convergent tasks
might seem to be inconsistent with the available evidence from fMRI
studies that, as we will see, rather systematically show weaker activation
of right-hemisphere structures in flexibility-heavy tasks than in
persistence-heavy tasks. But we need to consider that the alpha frequency
band is the lowest that the human brain exhibits, which means that
entraining neural firing patterns to synchronize at the lowest frequency
band possible reduces the average neural activity in the synchronized
brain systems. Accordingly, it should not be surprising that the alpha
band power synchronization is negatively correlated with BOLD signals
in the corresponding brain areas (Scheeringa et al., 2011; Scheeringa
et al., 2016). Hence, from the reviewed EEG studies, one would expect
lower BOLD activation in right-hemisphere structures in flexibility-heavy
tasks than in persistence-heavy tasks.
Indeed, the AUT induced weaker activations in the right than in the
left angular gyrus, and this asymmetry was more pronounced than in
object characteristic tasks (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b). The angular gyrus
is located in the parietal lobe and close to the superior temporal gyrus
(STG), and the weaker activation seen in the right angular gyrus is thus
consistent with reported increase of alpha synchronization in the poste-
rior parietal cortex of the right hemisphere as seen in EEG studies (Fink
et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kounios et al., 2006). During the preparation period
of insight trials in the RAT, the STG also showed stronger activation in
the left than the right hemisphere (Kounios et al., 2006). The angular
gyrus and the STG are located very close to each other, and are thought of
being part of a memory-related network (Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007;
Seghier, 2013). In flexibility-heavy creative thinking, areas in the
memory-related network of the right hemisphere exhibit a weaker and
more diffuse activation state, which is thought to facilitate the (re-)
combination of semantic information that is normally distantly related
(Jung-Beeman, 2005), which in turn is crucial in AUT performance. Note
that this fits the suggestion that alpha synchronization might facilitate
the (re-)combination of distantly related semantic associations (Fink
et al., 2009a, 2009b). Accordingly, we suggest that metacontrol flexi-
bility is characterized by increased alpha synchronization and weaker
BOLD signals in the relevant structures of the right hemisphere. As one
would expect from this perspective, convergent thinking was found to be
associated with the exact opposite pattern: alpha desynchronization and
stronger right hemisphere activation. For instance, alpha desynchroni-
zation has been found during analytic thinking (Kounios et al., 2006).
Even more interestingly, the left STG is more strongly activated during
the preparation period (during this period participants might be
searching for distantly semantic associations in memory) of insight
(Kounios et al., 2006), but at the moment when the insight occurs (i.e.,
when participants find the correct solution in the RAT), the right STG is
more strongly activated (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). This suggests that
insight solutions are characterized by a (perhaps spontaneously estab-
lished) flexibility-biased metacontrol state at the beginning of a trial that
turns into a persistence bias produced by the finding of the solution.
In conclusion, the right PPC and/or STG (and sometimes parts of the
occipital lobe) seem to be systematically affected bymetacontrol policies:
tasks or particular intervals of trials that rely on metacontrol flexibility
are associated with stronger alpha synchronization and weaker BOLD
signals in right-hemispheric brain structures, whereas tasks or intervals
that rely on persistence are associated with alpha desynchronization and
stronger BOLD signals in right-hemispheric brain structures. Alpha syn-
chronization and weaker BOLD in these structures seem to be associated
with a broader scope of the semantic search. As considered by Runco and
Yoruk (2014), divergent thinking such as in the AUT might lead the6participant to use some superficial representations of the object cue, so
that for instance a tin canwould be represented by its primary association
of being made of tin. This would be represented in the corresponding
working-memory structure in the left hemisphere, which in turn would
steer the search for secondary semantic or episodic associations, for
which structures in the right hemisphere would play an important role
(Jung-Beeman, 2005). This search should not be particularly selective
but rather broad, and thus benefit from the weak activation of a broader
areas (Runco and Yoruk, 2014). As mentioned already, this hypothesis
was indeed supported by the observation of stronger alpha synchroni-
zation in the right hemisphere in participants who exhibited high origi-
nality scores in the AUT (Fink et al., 2007), thought to reflect high
flexibility, because the distant or secondary associations, which could
help to differentiate an idea from common ideas, might be generated in
the right hemisphere.
3. Metacontrol of creative cognition: A neurocognitive
framework
Our selective review has revealed that divergent and convergent
thinking are associated with systematically different brain activity.
Divergent thinking and similar cognitive activities are characterized by a
neural activation pattern that consists of strong activation of left IFG (or a
bias of the left/right IFG relationship towards the left IFG) associated
with weak activation of the left DLPFC and of right-hemispheric struc-
tures like PPC and/or STG. If we assume that the left DLPFC codes for the
task goal and holds the guiding search template, the left IFG broadens the
search within the target domain, and the right PPC/STG controls the
grain size of the semantic/episodic memory search, this pattern nicely
fits with a flexible metacontrol style in the sense of Hommel’s Meta-
control State Model (2015; Hommel and Colzato, 2017a): according to
his model, flexible metacontrol is characterized by providing little
top-down guidance by representations of the action goal and only weak
competition between alternative selection candidates. Convergent
thinking, in turn, was found to be characterized by a neural activation
pattern that consists of weak activation of left IFG associated with strong
activation of both DLPFC and right-hemispheric structures including
right PPC and STG. It is easy to see that this pattern nicely fits with a
persistent metacontrol style that, according to Hommel’s Metacontrol
State Model, is characterized by providing strong top-down guidance by
goal representations and strong mutual competition between alternative
selection candidates.
We thus tentatively conclude that the two observed activation pat-
terns (lIFGþ, lDLPC-, rPPC/rSTG-vs. lIFG-, lDLPCþ, rPPC/rSTGþ)
represent examples of metacontrol states that are biased towards flexi-
bility and persistence, respectively (see Fig. 3). Assuming that flexibility
and persistence represent the two poles of a continuous metacontrol
dimension, we thus assume that the same holds for the observed acti-
vation patterns. That is, we speculate that left IFG and DLPFC and cor-
responding right-hemispheric structures form a neural network that can
vary continuously from lIFGþ, lDLPC-, rPPC/rSTG-to lIFG-, lDLPCþ,
rPPC/rSTGþ and, by doing so, serve to implement metacontrol biases of
different degrees towards flexibility and persistence, respectively.
Further assumptions will be necessary to capture the observations
obtained in insight trials of convergent thinking tasks, however.
Remember that such trials reveal a pattern showing strong activations of
both left IFG and the left DLPFC (Shen et al., 2018b; Zmigrod et al.,
2015), although there is still a trade-off between them (Nelson et al.,
2007). Right STG, the memory-related component, showed lower BOLD
activation in the preparation period of insight trials, together with
stronger alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere (Jung-Beeman
et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006). However, as soon as the insight
actually occurred, the right STG became more strongly activated
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). From a metacontrol perspective, this sce-
nario would suggest that the metacontrol state can change throughout an
insight trial (see Fig. 4): it starts with a mixture of strong DLPFC
Fig. 3. A proposed neurocognitive framework of the metacontrol of creative cognition. The key idea is that flexibility is promoted by weak activation of the
DLPFC and T/PC together with a strongly activated left IFG, whereas persistence would be characterized by the opposite pattern. Note that it may not the absolute
activation level of left IFG that matters but rather the balance between left and right IFG (Mayseless and Shamay-Tsoory, 2015).
Fig. 4. The metacontrol of insight. During an
insight trial of the RAT, the left IFG and the left
DLPFC might both be activated, although there is
still a trade-off between them, and the activation
pattern of the right STG changes throughout time.
In the preparation period, the right STG might
show a diffused and weaker activation pattern
(indicated by the size and color of the area
respectively) to facilitate the (re-)combination of
the distant or secondary associations. Once insight
actually occurs, the right STG would strongly be
activated, indicating that the only correct solution
is generated with an “Aha” feeling.
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the RAT (where the search template consists of three words rather than
one word), and a strongly activated IFG that indicates a flexibility bias,
together with only weakly activated right-hemispheric structures. But
once the moment of insight is reached, the state of right-hemispheric
structures would rather look like strong persistence, at least with
respect to the focus on memory items. In other words, the
right-hemispheric structures would tend to “zoom-in” onto the result of
the insight. This scenario has a number of suggestions that qualify our
tentative approach and identify critical questions that future research
needs to address.
First, it implies that the interplay between left IFG and right-
hemispheric structures might be more essential for the establishment of
flexibility in AUT than the degree to which DLPFC is activated.
Comparing Figs. 3 and 4 reveals that the relationship between IFG and
right-hemispheric activation is more systematic than the relationship
between either of these structures and DLPFC. It is true that the post-
insight part of Fig. 4 does not quite fit this description, but for reasons
that we spell out belowwe think that this misfit is only apparent. This less
systematic behavior of DLPFC is likely to reflect that the degree to which
it is activated during a task depends on its working-memory demands.
The activation of DLPFC is known to increase with the number or
complexity of the content it needs to hold, that is, on the working-7memory demands of the task (Hussein et al., 2014). These demands are
clearly higher in the RAT than in the AUT, as the former requires holding
three words and their related associations, while the latter requires
holding only one word. If, thus, DLPFC involvement increases with the
number of cue words, a stronger activation in the RAT may reflect the
working-memory demands of this task rather than its convergent nature.
For this reason, we speculate that, at least with verbal material, the
activation relationship between IFG and right-hemispheric structures is
more strongly related than the relationship with DLPFC, which in turn
might more depend on task-specific requirements unrelated to meta-
control, such as verbal information. However, note that this does not
necessarily imply the absence of privileged communication between left
DLPFC and right-hemispheric memory-related structures. Gross et al.
(2004) used MEG to identify a fronto-parieto-temporal network in an
attentional blink task, which—similarly to creativity tasks—required the
matching of activated verbal stimuli against a short-term-stored search
template. Synchronization analyses revealed particularly strong
communication between left frontal regions and right PPC in the beta
frequency band, and the strength of this communication predicted suc-
cessful performance. It is possible that a similar kind of communication is
established in creativity tasks, involving the left DLPFC and
right-hemispheric memory-related structures, and if this communication
is based on neural synchronization, it does not necessarily imply positive
W. Zhang et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116572relationships between the BOLD levels of the communicating structures.
Second, our scenario implies that metacontrol states can be changing
fast, even within one trial. This fits with recent claims of Mekern et al.
(2019b) that adaptive metacontrol may call for the ability of performing
rather quick switches between flexibility and persistence—an idea that
also fits with the implication of the stage model of creativity suggested by
Wallas (1926). The scenario would also suggest that such switches can
occur spontaneously or driven by the results of information processing.
Studies on insight have revealed that the probability of solving a problem
through analytical hypothesis-testing or through insight can be predicted
by the preparatory state, the particular metacontrol bias we would argue,
but so far it remains unclear when and why participants establish
particular preparatory states and why these states vary from trial to trial.
This suggests that metacontrol biases can undergo spontaneous drifts, so
that different trials are carried out under different flexibility or persis-
tence biases. Further research is needed to identify possible predictors of
such drifts, which could be time on task, success in the previous trial, the
search duration or difficulty in the previous trial, and more. According to
our scenario, changes in metacontrol bias may also be driven by the re-
sults of information processing, so that the search for a solution could be
broad, facilitated by a flexibility bias, but once a solution is found,
stronger persistence could set in to allow for the processing to focus on
the respective concept. Again, this would fit with the stage model sug-
gested by Wallas (1926). However, further research is needed to un-
derstand whether and how changes in metacontrol states are
communicated to the relevant neural systems.
4. Future research
Our framework provides a guide to investigate the similarities and
differences of divergent and convergent thinking from a metacontrol
perspective, which we feel can help organizing and integrating future
research efforts. First, neuroscientific studies, ideally combined with
machine learning or similar techniques, could aim to better characterize
states of convergent and divergent thinking on the one hand and states of
persistence and flexibility on the other, so to validate the idea that
thinking styles and metacontrol are related.
Second, this could be done in studies with manipulations that are
assumed to induce or promote particular metacontrol styles, such as
meditation (Hommel and Colzato, 2017a) or positive and negative affect
(Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004) to see whether and how these factors
modify metacontrol and thinking styles.
Third, it makes sense to regard our functional characterization of the
key players in regulating human creativity as an only intermediate step
towards the development of a more mechanistic computational model of
creative cognition and the (meta)control thereof (Mekern et al., 2019a).
We suspect that cognitive processes can be broken down into more to
specific neural computations, which can then be defined in the model as
specific parameters. For instance, Mekern et al. (2019b) have suggested
that the balance between persistence and flexibility might be determined
by a parameter that regulates the degree to which decision-making is
controlled by top-down, goal-related settings and the strength of inhi-
bition between alternative choices. This would provide us with a model
that can predict behavior on multiple creativity-like tasks—arguably one
of the biggest challenges in modern creativity research.
Fourth, the function of the right parietal cortex is still worth being
more investigated. In our framework, it might determine, together with
the right STG, the size of the search field in long-term memory. But it is
important to consider that is adjacent to ECN (anterior inferior parietal
cortex) and DN (posterior inferior parietal cortex). As we know, alpha
synchronization in this area implies internal attention, but how this is
related to different metacontrol state is still unclear.
Finally, it remains an open question whether, and how, norepineph-
rine is involved in the regulation of human creativity, and whether or
how it interacts with dopamine and, possibly, the activities of the right
parietal cortex.85. Conclusion
Taken altogether, we suggest that creative cognition in divergent- and
convergent-thinking tasks is modulated by metacontrol states, where
divergent thinking and insight solutions in convergent-thinking tasks
seem to rely on, or benefit from metacontrol biases towards flexibility,
whereas convergent, analytical thinking seems to rely on, or benefit from
metacontrol biases towards persistence. The particular metacontrol bia-
ses seem to be reflected by particular brain-activation patterns, which, at
least in the case of verbal materials, involves the left IFG and right-
hemispheric structures like PPC, STG, and/or occipital area. So far, the
patterns showed rather systematic across fMRI and EEG studies, but more
specific analyses of neural communication in particular frequency bands
do not necessarily translate into particular BOLD patterns. We admit that
our framework is very tentative and much further research is needed to
provide more details, but we do think it can serve as a first proxy to guide
such research into the mechanistic details of human creative cognition.
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